Author:
Lewin Michael, ,Chaly Vadim A.,Lugovoy Sergey V.,Kornilaev Leonid Yu., , ,
Abstract
In recent decades, Perspectivism has developed into an epistemological research program claiming its independence. This autonomy stems from Perspectivism’s potential ability to resolve the contradictions between realist and constructivist programs. Perspectivism is based on the idea that the object depends on perspective, which constitutes any subjective attempt to cognize it. Perspectivists reconstruct and explain the factors involved in the formation of perspective, identifying the conditionality of epistemic acts, using concepts such as “position”, “point of view”, “view”, “angle”, “horizon”, “focus”, “picture”, “context”, “aspect”, etc. Although these concepts are part of the Perspectivist’s toolkit, their meanings and interrelation have so far been taken for granted and have not yet been critically and comprehensively analyzed. The purpose of this article is to take steps toward clarifying the conceptual basis for defending Perspectivism as an epistemological program. Once consistently uncovered and correlated in a conceptual model, Perspectivist concepts can be used as a tool for a detailed analysis of theories, positions, and beliefs. The article begins with a preliminary description of the concept of Perspectivism and its brief history as an epistemological program. In particular, the first modern attempts to outline Perspectivist epistemology are described in the works of F.Kaulbach (1990), W. Stegmaier (2008), and M.Massimi (2017, 2020). The problem of identifying the special a priori status of Perspectivist notions as a strategy for justifying the autonomy of Perspectivism is then posed. A method for demonstrating such a status, based on Kant’s transcendentalism and P. Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics, is then suggested.
Publisher
Saint Petersburg State University
Subject
Sociology and Political Science,Philosophy,Religious studies,Cultural Studies