Health care insurance policies When the provider and patient may collude-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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Health care insurance policies When the provider and patient may collude

Published:2020-12-17 Issue:3 Volume:30 Page:525-543
ISSN:1057-9230
Container-title:Health Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Health Economics

Author:

Wu Yaping¹,Bardey David²³,Chen Yijuan⁴,Li Sanxi⁵^ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Institute of Economics and Finance Nanjing Audit University Nanjing China

2. Department of Economics University of Los Andes Bogotá Colombia

3. Toulouse School of Economics Toulouse France

4. Research School of Economics Australian National University Canberra Australia

5. School of Economics Renmin University of China Beijing China

Funder

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Health Policy

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/hec.4206

Reference26 articles.

1. Treatment and referral decisions under different physician payment mechanisms

2. Payment mechanism and GP self-selection: capitation versus fee for service

3. Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion

4. Supply induced demand, ex post moral hazard and optimal health insurance contract;Bardey D.;Annals of Economics and Statistics,2006

5. Optimal non-linear health insurance

Cited by 2 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. A systematic review of strategies used for controlling consumer moral hazard in health systems;BMC Health Services Research;2022-10-18

2. A Model of Hospital Congestion with Imperfect Referral System;Revue d'économie politique;2021-12-14

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