Affiliation:
1. School of Management Hefei University of Technology Hefei China
2. Key Laboratory of Process Optimization and Intelligent Decision‐making Ministry of Education Hefei China
Abstract
AbstractThis paper considers a two‐population evolutionary game between incremental component suppliers and new energy vehicle (NEV) manufacturers to explore their intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) production decisions in the long term. The government subsidy policy is taken into consideration in the extended model. Through analysis, we derive all the possible evolutionary results and obtain while the static subsidy affects the thresholds compared with non‐government subsidy situation, it has no effect on the overall evolutionary direction. However, the dynamic subsidy can remove the periodic behavior of the ICV supply chain participants. This paper provides some suggestions to enhance the ICV industry development.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Natural Science Foundation of Anhui Province
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
Subject
Management of Technology and Innovation,Management Science and Operations Research,Strategy and Management,Business and International Management