Optimal innovation incentive strategies within the health crowdsourcing platform

Author:

Liu Jianyue1,Ma Zhiqiang1ORCID,Zhu Binxin1

Affiliation:

1. School of Management Jiangsu University Zhenjiang China

Abstract

AbstractLack of incentive strategies within the health crowdsourcing platform has resulted in the loss of patient innovation and the failure in the diffusion of patients' innovations. To solve this problem, we compared four incentive strategies: (i) without incentive, (ii) cost‐sharing incentive, (iii) revenue‐sharing incentive, and (iv) a hybrid incentive strategy combining cost‐sharing and revenue‐sharing. Our analysis indicates that the innovation guidance effect is at its lowest level without incentive strategies, and the hybrid incentive strategy can maximize both innovation enthusiasm and profits. Furthermore, there exists a threshold for revenue‐sharing ratio, making the incentive effect of revenue‐sharing strategy better than that of the cost‐sharing strategy. Finally, short‐sighted thinking among platform participants will reduce the innovation enthusiasm of altruistic patients and the incentive investment of the platform. This study provides guiding principles for the health crowdsourcing platform to regulate online patient innovation solutions.

Funder

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Publisher

Wiley

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3