Abstract
The ethics of the legal profession may be seen as an instance of role‐differentiated morality. People acting in professional roles remain moral agents, who must respond appropriately to moral reasons. At the same time, a role may impose demands that are inconsistent with the obligations of ordinary, nonprofessional morality. The role of lawyer may, for example, require asserting a procedural defense to defeat a morally compelling claim for compensation. Lawyers may be permitted or required to cross‐examine truthful witnesses to suggest to the jury that they are lying, or to put on testimony that will similarly mislead the trier of fact. They may keep information secret that, if disclosed, would prevent serious harm to others. Lawyers also may take up the cause of an unworthy client, seeking to obtain some advantage that is contrary to considerations of justice. Familiarly, criminal defense lawyers may try to obtain the acquittal of a client who in fact committed the crime charged. In each of these cases, lawyers believe themselves to be justifiably obligated to follow the demands of their role, even though there appear to be good moral reasons to act to the contrary. The discipline of philosophical legal ethics is largely devoted to working out the relationship between the demands of the professional role and ordinary moral considerations.