Home Alone: The Effects of Lone-Insider Boards on CEO Pay, Financial Misconduct, and Firm Performance-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Home Alone: The Effects of Lone-Insider Boards on CEO Pay, Financial Misconduct, and Firm Performance

Author:

Zorn Michelle L.¹,Shropshire Christine²,Martin John A.³,Combs James G.⁴,Ketchen David J.¹

Affiliation:

1. Department of Management, Harbert College of Business; Auburn University; Auburn Alabama

2. Department of Management and Entrepreneurship, W. P. Carey School of Business; Arizona State University; Tempe Arizona

3. Department of Management and International Business, Raj Soin College of Business; Wright State University; Dayton Ohio

4. Department of Management, College of Business Administration; University of Central Florida; Orlando Florida

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Strategy and Management,Business and International Management

Reference140 articles.

2. A theory of friendly boards;Adams;Journal of Finance,2007

4. Passive investors, not passive owners;Appel;Journal of Financial Economics,2016

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