A performance‐based payment: Signaling the quality of a credence good-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A performance‐based payment: Signaling the quality of a credence good

Published:2021-02-15 Issue:5 Volume:42 Page:1117-1131
ISSN:0143-6570
Container-title:Managerial and Decision Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Manage Decis Econ

Author:

Berg Nathan¹,Kim Jeong‐Yoo²,Seon Ilgyun²

Affiliation:

1. Department of Economics University of Otago Dunedin New Zealand

2. Department of Economics Kyung Hee University Seoul South Korea

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Management of Technology and Innovation,Management Science and Operations Research,Strategy and Management,Business and International Management

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/mde.3295

Reference24 articles.

1. High and declining prices signal product quality;Bagwell K.;American Economic Review,1991

2. Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

3. Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

4. Expertise and contingent fees: The role of asymmetric information in attorney compensation;Dana J. D.;Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1993

5. Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud

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