Disentangling incentives effects of insurance coverage from adverse selection in the case of drug expenditure: a finite mixture approach-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Disentangling incentives effects of insurance coverage from adverse selection in the case of drug expenditure: a finite mixture approach

Published:2010-07-11 Issue:9 Volume:19 Page:1093-1108
ISSN:1057-9230
Container-title:Health Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Health Econ.

Author:

Munkin Murat K.,Trivedi Pravin K.

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Health Policy

Link

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1002/hec.1636/fullpdf

Reference31 articles.

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