Prejudice is epistemically unwarranted belief

Abstract

AbstractIn two preregistered online studies with U.S. adults, we provide evidence of a common psychological profile characterizing belief in prejudicial and non‐prejudicial epistemically unwarranted claims. We solicited self‐report ratings of beliefs in prejudicial and non‐prejudicial pseudoscientific, conspiratorial, and paranormal claims, as well as individual difference measures related to cognitive style, social dominance orientation (SDO), and trust in science. We found moderate to strong positive correlations between endorsing prejudicial and non‐prejudicial unwarranted claims, and robustly replicable associations between endorsement of all the assessed varieties of epistemically unwarranted beliefs, SDO, and perceptions of the credibility of science. Our findings suggest that individuals who endorse epistemically unwarranted beliefs are not only characterized by a rejection of epistemic authority (e.g., science), but also by preferences for a rigid, inequitably stratified society. This suggests that successfully challenging epistemically unwarranted beliefs may benefit by incorporating explicit challenges to social dominance motivations.