Photon Number Splitting Attack – Proposal and Analysis of an Experimental Scheme

Abstract

AbstractPhoton‐number‐splitting (PNS) is a well‐known theoretical attack on quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that employ weak coherent states produced by attenuated laser pulses. However, beyond the fact that it has not yet been demonstrated experimentally, its plausibility and effect on quantum bit error rate are questioned. In this work, an experimental scheme is presented for PNS attack employing demonstrated technological capabilities, specifically a single‐photon Raman interaction (SPRINT) in a cavity‐enhanced three‐level atomic system. Several aspects of the proposed implementation are addressed, analytically and simulatively, and the eavesdropper's information gain by the attack is calculated. Furthermore, it is analytically shown that the scheme results in a small (yet non‐zero) quantum bit error rate, and a comparison to purely theoretical analyses in the literature is presented. It is believed that the inherent nonlinearity of the PNS attack unavoidably affects the optical modes sent to the receiver, and accordingly will always result in some error rate.