The optimal decision for automobile enterprises considering shareholding strategies and dual‐credit policy

Abstract

AbstractThis article develops a new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer, considers the incentive effect of the dual‐credit policy, proposes three shareholding strategies (manufacturer shareholding, retailer shareholding, and cross‐shareholding), and investigates the optimal decisions of NEV enterprises. Our results indicate that increased credit trading price, manufacturer shareholding ratio, and retailer shareholding ratio all improve NEV low‐carbon levels and manufacturer profits. In contrast, the performance of retailer profits is more complex and requires a lower range of shareholding ratio in most situations to achieve growth. Meanwhile, the cross‐shareholding strategy is the optimal choice for the manufacturer. However, the retailer only sometimes benefits from a cross‐shareholding strategy, and the manufacturer shareholding strategy can lead to the highest retailer profits in most cases. Furthermore, these findings can provide critical managerial insights for automobile enterprises and governments.