Accountability in an agency model: Project selection, effort incentives, and contract design*-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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Accountability in an agency model: Project selection, effort incentives, and contract design*

Published:2018-12-07 Issue:2 Volume:40 Page:150-158
ISSN:0143-6570
Container-title:Managerial and Decision Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Manage Decis Econ

Author:

Lukas Christian¹^ORCID,Neubert Max‐Frederik²^ORCID,Schöndube Jens Robert³^ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Chair of Business Administration and Managerial AccountingFriedrich‐Schiller‐Universität Jena Jena Germany

2. Chair in Accounting and ControlOtto‐von‐Guericke Universität Magdeburg Magdeburg Germany

3. Institute of Managerial AccountingLeibniz Universität Hannover Hannover Germany

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Management of Technology and Innovation,Management Science and Operations Research,Strategy and Management,Business and International Management

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/mde.2989

Reference38 articles.

1. Economics and Identity*

2. Identity and the Economics of Organizations

3. Relational delegation

4. Pressure and Performance in Accounting Decision Settings: Paradoxical Effects of Incentives, Feedback, and Justification

5. Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement

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1. Exploring decision-making: experimental observations on project selection and the impact of justification pressure;Journal of Management and Governance;2024-09-02

2. Incentive contract design and selection for inhibiting unethical collusion in construction projects;Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management;2023-08-22

3. Collusion governance strategies under the construction supervision system in China;Construction Management and Economics;2023-04-20

4. On interim performance evaluations and interdependent period outcomes;Journal of Management Control;2023-02-14

5. Can process accountability mitigate myopic biases? An experimental analysis;Journal of Management Control;2022-01-01

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