Affiliation:
1. INRAE, Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire Sciences Innovations Société (Université Gustave Eiffel/CNRS/INRAE) Marne la Vallée Cedex France
2. School for the Future of Innovation in Society Arizona State University Tempe Arizona USA
3. Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver Denver Colorado USA
Abstract
AbstractAlthough street‐level bureaucrats (SLBs) play a key role in the implementation of market‐based instruments (MBIs), their participation is widely understudied. This paper addresses this blind spot by engaging the concept of street‐level bureaucratic policy entrepreneurship. Using the case of conservation banking, a market‐based environmental policy in the United States, we explore why this novel instrument has only been adopted in a handful of jurisdictions. We examine both non‐adoption and adoption of conservation banking to find that SLBs are likely to engage in such entrepreneurial acts when a new policy form is particularly useful in legitimizing regulatory enforcement. Implementing a MBI is, however, not straightforward. Organizational conditions can restrain SLB autonomy to implement MBIs, preferring instead to persist with baseline policies, which further underscores the importance of SLB risk‐taking behavior. SLBs must strategically straddle their unique position between the market and the hierarchy to enroll different actors into the new policy arrangement, all within dynamic political–economic conditions.
Funder
Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Subject
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Public Administration,Sociology and Political Science,Political Science and International Relations
Cited by
2 articles.
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