Configurations of corporate governance mechanisms and sustainable development

Abstract

AbstractAiming to shed light on the interplay of board‐related mechanisms and their influence on sustainable development, this study examines configurations of corporate governance conditions that are associated with high and low ESG performance. Fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis was used, resorting to a sample of S&P 500 manufacturing companies that are committed to contributing to solve the climate change societal challenge (i.e., SDG13). The configurational analysis was also extended to the all sample of S&P 500 companies to assure the generalizability of the findings and provide additional insights. The findings support the functional view of the role of the board, emphasising the notion that configurations (i.e., combinations of conditions) are more important to sustainable development than any single condition. Different from past research, this study emphasises the importance of defining and implementing a CSR strategy to achieve high ESG performance, which is always present in configurations leading to the outcome of interest. Furthermore, the results also suggest that a monitoring mechanism should always be present, while an incentive alignment mechanism is only required in some circumstances. Moreover, the results show that ESG‐related executive compensation should be complemented with other mechanisms, such as board monitoring, to be effective. This study contributes to the debate on whether sustainability‐related performance alignment incentives and monitoring mechanisms act as complements or substitutes. The findings show that linear approaches might not capture the all picture, suggesting that a more nuanced view should be used in future studies, and can inform companies' strategic decisions regarding sustainability.