Identifiability impedes efficiency maximization: A third‐party perspective

Abstract

AbstractThis research explores the hypothesis that third‐party decision makers will be less likely to switch from a suboptimal default payoff to a more efficient alternative one when payoff receipts have been identified than when they have not, even when identification conveys no relevant information. While Studies 1 and 2 establish this identifiability effect by manipulating identifiability with real names (“S. Jones” / “R. Smith”) in realistic decision making vignettes, Studies 3 and 4 replicate the effect by manipulating identifiability with simple designations (“Participant A” / “Participant B”) in incentivized decision paradigms that involve real monetary payoffs. And while Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate the identifiability effect among third‐party decision makers choosing to switch from a default payoff to a more efficient alternative payoff, Study 3 instantiates the identifiability effect even when changing the status quo is mandatory. Finally, both Studies 3 and 4 probed for possible psychological mechanisms, finding that analytical processing mode, in particular, may play a role in these third‐party allocations.