Affiliation:
1. School of Economics and Management Southwest University of Science and Technology Mianyang China
Abstract
AbstractThis paper considers an e‐commerce supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an online platform and investigates the manufacturer's pricing decisions without and with platform coupons and the online platform's coupon decision under different power structures. In the manufacturer (platform) Stackelberg power structure, issuing platform coupons cannot (can) always stimulate the demand and benefit the manufacturer, the online platform, and the entire system. In the vertical Nash power structure, issuing platform coupons can always stimulate demand and benefit the manufacturer and the entire system but cannot always benefit the online platform.
Funder
Natural Science Foundation of Sichuan Province
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China
Subject
Management of Technology and Innovation,Management Science and Operations Research,Strategy and Management,Business and International Management
Cited by
1 articles.
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