Affiliation:
1. College for Cyber Security, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), Chengdu 611731, China
2. Faculty of Data Science, City University of Macau, Macao, China
3. Discipline of Information Technology, Murdoch University, Perth, Australia
Abstract
Electronic auction is a popular platform to sell goods, task assignment, and resources’ allocation due to reductions of transaction costs and has attracted a huge number of potential buyers. However, it is challenging to address the disputes between the buyer and the auctioneer. The main reason is, on the one hand, solving such problem leverages to the broad domain of research aspects, such as economic theory, engineering, and cryptography, and, on the other hand, it is difficult to arbitrate in a decentralized and anonymous setting. In this work, we consider a more general framework to solve the potential disputes by enforcing bidirectional confirmation and public verification. Hence, the bidding procedure is clear to inspect and potential disputes can be erased. To achieve this goal, we propose policy-driven chameleon hash and revised linkable-and-redactable ring signature as building blocks. We used these two tools to build a bidirectional and anonymous auction protocol called
P. In our
P protocol, the bidders can competitively and anonymously place their bids to outbid others. At the end of the auction protocol, everyone can verify the validity of the bidding proof and decide the winner. Thus, dispute-freeness feature is achieved. The analysis suggests that our proposal is provably secure and practically efficient, and it trades some efficiencies with dispute-freeness feature.
Subject
Computer Networks and Communications,Information Systems
Cited by
3 articles.
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