Government Intervention and Subjectivity of Non-State-Owned Enterprises under “Double Carbon” Target

Abstract

Facing the challenge of increasingly serious environmental problems, the government has put forward the “Double Carbon” target. The government and the non-state-owned enterprises are the core participants of the “Double Carbon” target. The subjective game model is used to analyze the behavioral strategies of the government and non-state-owned enterprises in the process of achieving the “Double Carbon” goal. The research contents of this paper are as follows: Firstly, the relevant theories and literatures are summarized, and the necessity and contribution of this study are given. Secondly, the subjective game model between the government and non-state-owned enterprises under the “Double Carbon” goal is constructed. And the dynamic game equation, the dynamic game equilibrium, and the dynamic evolution process of the game subject are analyzed and discussed. Then, the influencing factors of the decision-making of the game subject are analyzed. Finally, the following conclusions are drawn. When the government do not take any action, non-state-owned enterprises generally do not actively participate in the “Double Carbon” target. In order to promote non-state-owned enterprises to actively participate in the “Double Carbon” goal, the government should adopt the policy of subsidy and incentive to reduce the entry threshold and entry barrier of non-state-owned enterprises. In order to maximize the benefit of the “Double Carbon” goal, the government should take punitive measures at the same time. The government should further improve the corresponding laws and regulations and improve the property rights trading market. Actively guide and regulate the behavior of non-state-owned enterprises to achieve the goal of “Double Carbon,” and bring greater social benefit.