Prospect Theory-Based Two-Sided Satisfied and Stable Matching Mechanism for the Shared Parking Slots Problem

Abstract

The contradiction between the dramatic increase in the aggregate number of automobiles and the short supply of parking spaces leads to parking difficulties. Sharing mode helps improve the efficiency of existing parking spaces, increase resource utilization, and alleviate the difficulty of parking. This paper focuses on the matching mechanism in the shared parking slots problem, which involves three agents: shared parking suppliers, shared parking demanders, and shared parking platform. We propose a prospect theory-based two-sided satisfied and stable matching model (PT-TSSM) with two objectives to maximize the satisfaction degree of both shared parking demanders and shared parking suppliers. Numerical experiments are illustrated to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed model. Moreover, the PT-TSSM model is compared with the other two shared parking mechanisms. The proposed model considers the satisfaction degrees of both shared parking demanders and suppliers, while first book first serve (FBFS) cares only one side of the participants. And compared with deferred acceptance (DA), our model not only takes two-sided stable matching into account but also considers the satisfaction degree of all the demand and supply participants, which obtain a two-sided satisfied and stable matching scheme.