Publicly Verifiable M + 1st-Price Auction Fit for IoT with Minimum Storage

Abstract

In an $M+1$ st-price auction, all bidders submit their bids simultaneously, and the $M$ highest bidders purchase $M$ identical goods at the $M+1$ st bidding price. Previous research is constructed based on trusted managers such as a trusted third party (TTP), trusted mix servers, and honest managers. All of the previous auctions are not fit for edge-assisted IoT since they need TTP. In this paper, we formalize a notion of commutative bi-homomorphic multiparty encryption and achieve no-TTP $M+1$ -st auction based on blockchain with public verifiability. Our $M+1$ st auction guarantees financial fairness, robustness, and correctness without TTP and is secure under a malicious model for the first time. Our $M+1$ st auction can be executed over a distributed network and is thus fit for edge-assisted IoT. Furthermore, our formalized commutative bi-homomorphic multiparty encryption can be used in various applications for edge-assisted IoT, which needs to protect privacy and correctness.