Secure Outsourced Attribute-Based Signatures with Perfect Anonymity in the Standard Model

Abstract

Outsourced attribute-based signatures (OABS) enable users to sign messages without revealing specific identity information and are suitable for scenarios with limited computing power. Recently, Mo et al. proposed an expressive outsourced attribute-based signature scheme (Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications, 11, 2017). In this paper, we show that Mo et al.’s scheme does not achieve any of the three security properties. Their scheme is incorrect. The adversary can collude with the malicious signing-cloud service provider (S-CSP) to forge valid signatures on any message and any attribute set. And the S-CSP could trace the access structures used to generate the signatures. Then, we treat the S-CSP as an adversary and present more accurate unforgeability and anonymity models for OABS to remedy the drawbacks of the previous ones. Finally, we propose a simple but significant improvement to fix our attacks. The improved scheme achieves correctness, unforgeability, and perfect anonymity while keeping the efficiency almost unchanged. We also prove the security of the improved scheme under the standard model.