Supervision Strategy Analysis on Price Discrimination of E-Commerce Company in the Context of Big Data Based on Four-Party Evolutionary Game

Abstract

This paper focuses on the phenomenon of “big data killing” implied in e-commerce and discusses how to take the government as the lead to coordinately supervise the price discrimination behavior of e-commerce companies towards loyal customers. First, the four-party evolutionary game model of the government regulatory department, e-commerce platform, e-commerce company, and consumer is built. Second, the stability of the strategy choice of each game subject is analyzed. On this basis, the evolutionary stable strategy in the system based on First Law of Lyapunov is explored. Finally, the influences of key elements on system evolution are simulated and analyzed by MATLAB2021. Results demonstrate that (1) the government supervision mechanism can effectively supervise the price discrimination of e-commerce company based on big data to loyal customers; (2) when the government chooses the strict supervision strategy, reducing the information supervision cost of the e-commerce platform and the strict supervision cost of the government enable the government and the e-commerce platform to coordinate supervision and make the e-commerce company incline to choose the nondifferential pricing strategy; (3) when the government chooses the loose supervision strategy, reducing the information supervision cost of the e-commerce platform and increasing the probability of consumer discovering differential pricing and the penalties for differential pricing of e-commerce company enable the e-commerce platform and consumer to coordinate supervision, and make the e-commerce company incline to choose the nondifferential pricing strategy. The results of this study can provide theoretical guidance for the government and companies to make beneficial strategic decisions in the development of e-commerce.