A Low-Overhead and High-Precision Attack Traceback Scheme with Combination Bloom Filters

Abstract

Distributed denial of service attacks seriously threatens the availability of highly resilient software-defined networking systems, such as data center networks. A traceback scheme is an effective means of mitigating attacks by identifying the location of the attacker and the attacking path. However, traditional traceback schemes suffer from low traceability success rates, high packet header overheads, and high communication traffic overheads, in addition to the fact that logically centralized traceability schemes make the control plane a prime target for attacks. To overcome the above challenges, we propose the low-overhead and high-precision traceback scheme, which is divided into two stages: packet marking and path reconstruction. The first stage of the traceback scheme utilizes programmable switches in the data plane to selectively mark the actual physical path information that the packet was forwarded on. The marking method is adaptive to the path length, which utilizes a combined Bloom filter so that the packet length does not grow with the length of the attacking path. The proposed probabilistic packet marking algorithm effectively reduces the number of packets collected to reconstruct the attacking path. The second stage of the traceback scheme utilizes the distributed victim host to reconstruct the attacking path without the controller and locate the source of the attacker. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show that the proposed scheme ensures the high accuracy of tracing and minimizes the traffic overhead and storage overhead required for the traceback process.