Abstract
Even though the Polish systemic solution at the municipal level has been classified as a strong model system, institutional rules allow for the creation of divided government. This means that a council gains in relations with a mayor from the perspective of the specific nature of horizontal power relations, when the mayor represents a different committee than the majority of councillors. The council becomes a player that can block the decision-making process, including the most important process of adopting the budget. However, in political practice, there is no evidence that the council becomes a veto player. A council does not have tools to influence a mayor, who, unlike councillors, has sanctioned substantive organisational and administrative support as well as instruments of influence resulting from systemic conditions.
Publisher
Institute of Political Studies - Polish Academy of Sciences
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