Affiliation:
1. Università di Catania, Catania, ITALY
2. University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
Abstract
Classical security protocols aim to achieve authentication and confidentiality under the assumption that the peers behave honestly. Some recent protocols are required to achieve their goals even if the peer misbehaves.
Accountability
is a protocol design strategy that may help. It delivers to peers sufficient evidence of each other's participation in the protocol. Accountability underlies the nonrepudiation protocol of Zhou and Gollmann and the certified email protocol of Abadi et al. This paper provides a comparative, formal analysis of the two protocols, and confirms that they reach their goals under realistic conditions. The treatment, which is conducted with mechanized support from the proof assistant Isabelle, requires various extensions to the existing analysis method. A byproduct is an account of the concept of
higher-level protocol
.
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Subject
Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality,General Computer Science
Cited by
19 articles.
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1. Three Branches of Accountability;Protocols, Strands, and Logic;2021
2. Dateneigentum oder aktive Transparenz?;Protektion 4.0: Das Digitalisierungsdilemma;2020
3. Causality & Control Flow;Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science;2019-10-31
4. The Tactical Management Method “DENICA” in Practice: Business Cases;Tactical Management in Complexity;2019-08-11
5. Computational Accountability in MAS Organizations with ADOPT;Applied Sciences;2018-03-23