Towards Device Independent Eavesdropping on Telephone Conversations with Built-in Accelerometer

Abstract

Motion sensors in modern smartphones have been exploited for audio eavesdropping in loudspeaker mode due to their sensitivity to vibrations. In this paper, we further move one step forward to explore the feasibility of using built-in accelerometer to eavesdrop on the telephone conversation of caller/callee who takes the phone against cheek-ear and design our attack Vibphone. The inspiration behind Vibphone is that the speech-induced vibrations (SIV) can be transmitted through the physical contact of phone-cheek to accelerometer with the traces of voice content. To this end, Vibphone faces three main challenges: i) Accurately detecting SIV signals from miscellaneous disturbance; ii) Combating the impact of device diversity to work with a variety of attack scenarios; and iii) Enhancing feature-agnostic recognition model to generalize to newly issued devices and reduce training overhead. To address these challenges, we first conduct an in-depth investigation on SIV features to figure out the root cause of device diversity impacts and identify a set of critical features that are highly relevant to the voice content retained in SIV signals and independent of specific devices. On top of these pivotal observations, we propose a combo method that is the integration of extracted critical features and deep neural network to recognize speech information from the spectrogram representation of acceleration signals. We implement the attack using commodity smartphones and the results show it is highly effective. Our work brings to light a fundamental design vulnerability in the vast majority of currently deployed smartphones, which may put people's speech privacy at risk during phone calls. We also propose a practical and effective defense solution. We validate that it is feasible to prevent audio eavesdropping by using random variation of sampling rate.