Abstract
This note surveys recent work in generalized matching theory, focusing on trading networks with transferable utility. In trading networks with a finite set of contractual opportunities, the substitutability of agents' preferences is essential for the guaranteed existence of stable outcomes and the correspondence of stable outcomes with competitive equilibria. Closely analogous results hold when venture participation is continuously adjustable, but under a concavity condition on agents' preferences which allows for some types of complementarity.
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Reference44 articles.
1. The New York City High School Match
2. Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
3. The Boston Public School Match
4. Alaei S. Jain K. and Malekian A. 2011a. Competitive equilibrium in two sided matching markets with general utility functions. Preprint arXiv:1006.4696v3. Alaei S. Jain K. and Malekian A. 2011a. Competitive equilibrium in two sided matching markets with general utility functions. Preprint arXiv:1006.4696v3.
5. Competitive equilibrium in two sided matching markets with general utility functions