Mechanisms for Fair Attribution-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Mechanisms for Fair Attribution

Published:2015-06-15 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
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Author:

Balkanski Eric¹,Singer Yaron²

Affiliation:

1. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

2. Harvard University, Cambrdige, MA, USA

Funder

National Science Foundation

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2764468.2764505

Reference36 articles.

1. Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets

2. The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation

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4. Learning on a budget

5. Bei X. Chen N. Gravin N. and Lu P. 2012. Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian. In STOC. 449--458. 10.1145/2213977.2214020 Bei X. Chen N. Gravin N. and Lu P. 2012. Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian. In STOC. 449--458. 10.1145/2213977.2214020

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