Equilibrium analysis of electricity markets with day-ahead market power mitigation and real-time intercept bidding-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Equilibrium analysis of electricity markets with day-ahead market power mitigation and real-time intercept bidding

Published:2022-06-28 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the Thirteenth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Bansal Rajni Kant¹,Chen Yue²,You Pengcheng³,Mallada Enrique¹

Affiliation:

1. Johns Hopkins University

2. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong SAR, China

3. Peking University, Beijing, China

Funder

NSF (National Science Foundation)

CUHK Direct Grant for Research

NSFC

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3538637.3538839

Reference19 articles.

1. 2020. ENERGY PRIMER: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics. FERC Division of Energy Market Assessments Staff Report. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 2020. ENERGY PRIMER: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics. FERC Division of Energy Market Assessments Staff Report. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

2. 2021. Energy market & operational data . Technical Report. New York ISO. Retrieved January 8, 2022 from https://www.nyiso.com/energy-market-operational-data 2021. Energy market & operational data. Technical Report. New York ISO. Retrieved January 8, 2022 from https://www.nyiso.com/energy-market-operational-data

3. 2021. Pennsylvania New Jersey and Maryland (PJM) Data Miner. Available at url. https://dataminer2.pjm.com/feed/hrl_da_demand_bids/definition 2021. Pennsylvania New Jersey and Maryland (PJM) Data Miner. Available at url. https://dataminer2.pjm.com/feed/hrl_da_demand_bids/definition

4. Rajni Kant Bansal Pengcheng You Dennice F. Gayme and Enrique Mallada. 2021. A Market Mechanism for Truthful Bidding with Energy Storage. arXiv:2109.14596 [math.OC] Rajni Kant Bansal Pengcheng You Dennice F. Gayme and Enrique Mallada. 2021. A Market Mechanism for Truthful Bidding with Energy Storage. arXiv:2109.14596 [math.OC]

5. INEFFICIENCIES AND MARKET POWER IN FINANCIAL ARBITRAGE: A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY MARKETS*