Agent-Based Model of Initial Token Allocations: Simulating Distributions post Fair Launch

Abstract

With advancements in distributed ledger technologies and smart contracts, tokenized voting rights gained prominence within decentralized finance (DeFi). Voting rights tokens (a.k.a. governance tokens) are fungible tokens that grant individual holders the right to vote upon the fate of a project. The motivation behind these tokens is to achieve decentral control within a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO). Because the initial allocations of these tokens is often undemocratic, the DeFi project and DAO of Yearn Finance experimented with a fair launch allocation where no tokens are pre-mined and all participants have an equal opportunity to receive them. Regardless, research on voting rights tokens highlights the formation of timocracies over time. The consideration is that the tokens’ tradability is the cause of concentration. To examine this proposition, this article uses an agent-based model to simulate and analyze the concentration of voting rights tokens post three fair launch allocation scenarios under different trading modalities. The results show that regardless of the allocation, concentration persistently occurs. It confirms the consideration that the ‘disease’ is endogenous: the cause of concentration is the tokens’ tradability. The findings inform theoretical understandings and practical implications for on-chain governance mediated by tokens.