The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two

Published:2014-06 Issue:2 Volume:2 Page:1-24
ISSN:2167-8375
Container-title:ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
language:en
Short-container-title:ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.

Author:

Chen Xujin¹,Doerr Benjamin²,Doerr Carola³,Hu Xiaodong¹,Ma Weidong¹,van Stee Rob⁴

Affiliation:

1. Institute of Applied Mathematics, AMSS, Chinese Academy of Sciences

2. Max Planck Institute for Informatics and École Polytechnique

3. Max Planck Institute for Informatics and Université Paris Diderot

4. Max Planck Institute for Informatics

Abstract

We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first sharp bound for the maximum latency objective.

Funder

Chinese Academy of Sciences

Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China

Google

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Agence Nationale de la Recherche

CONNECT

Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)

Subject

Computational Mathematics,Marketing,Economics and Econometrics,Statistics and Probability,Computer Science (miscellaneous)

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2548545

Reference21 articles.

1. Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games

2. The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation

3. Path decomposition under a new cost measure with applications to optical network design

4. Large the price of routing unsplittable flow