Matching "versus" mechanism design-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Matching "versus" mechanism design

Published:2012-12 Issue:2 Volume:11 Page:4-15
ISSN:1551-9031
Container-title:ACM SIGecom Exchanges
language:en
Short-container-title:SIGecom Exch.

Author:

Budish Eric¹

Affiliation:

1. University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Abstract

In a typical mechanism design paper the goal is to find a mechanism that maximizes the designer's objective (e.g., social welfare) subject to technology and incentive constraints. In a typical applied matching paper, by contrast, the goal is to find a mechanism that satisfies various "good properties" (e.g., efficiency and fairness). This essay discusses the relationship and tradeoffs between these two approaches. An introductory example, school choice, represents a simple win for the good properties approach. The main example, course allocation, paints a more complicated picture.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2509002.2509005

Reference38 articles.

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