Deep optimization for spectrum repacking

Author:

Newman Neil1,Fréchette Alexandre1,Leyton-Brown Kevin1

Affiliation:

1. University of British Columbia, Canada

Abstract

Over 13 months in 2016--17 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission conducted an "incentive auction" to repurpose radio spectrum from broadcast television to wireless internet. In the end, the auction yielded $19.8 bn, $10.05 bn of which was paid to 175 broadcasters for voluntarily relinquishing their licenses across 14 Ultra High Frequency (UHF) channels. Stations that continued broadcasting were assigned potentially new channels to fit as densely as possible into the channels that remained. The government netted more than $7 bn (used to pay down the national debt) after covering costs (including retuning). A crucial element of the auction design was the construction of a solver, dubbed SAT-based Feasibility Checker (SATFC), that determined whether sets of stations could be "repacked" in this way; it needed to run every time a station was given a price quote. This paper describes the process by which we built SATFC. We adopted an approach we dub "deep optimization," taking a data-driven, highly parametric, and computationally intensive approach to solver design. More specifically, to build SATFC we designed software that could pair both complete and local-search SAT-encoded feasibility checking with a wide range of domain-specific techniques, such as constraint graph decomposition and novel caching mechanisms that allow for reuse of partial solutions from related, solved problems. We then used automatic algorithm configuration techniques to construct a portfolio of 8 complementary algorithms to be run in parallel, aiming to achieve good performance on instances that arose in proprietary auction simulations. To evaluate the impact of our solver in this paper, we built an open-source reverse auction simulator. We found that within the short time budget required in practice, SATFC solved more than 95% of the problems it encountered. Furthermore, the incentive auction paired with SATFC produced nearly optimal allocations in a restricted setting and substantially outperformed other alternatives at national scale.

Funder

Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada

Auctionomics, Inc.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)

Subject

General Computer Science

Reference35 articles.

1. Models and solution techniques for frequency assignment problems

2. Variable and value elimination in binary constraint satisfaction via forbidden patterns

3. Cramton P. Lopez H. Malec D. Sujarittanonta P. Design of the reverse auction in the broadcast incentive auction. Working Paper (2015) http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2015-2019/cramton-reverse-auction-design-fcc-comment-pn.pdf 2015. Cramton P. Lopez H. Malec D. Sujarittanonta P. Design of the reverse auction in the broadcast incentive auction. Working Paper (2015) http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2015-2019/cramton-reverse-auction-design-fcc-comment-pn.pdf 2015.

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