Affiliation:
1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
The best way to sell
n
items to a buyer who values each of them independently and uniformly randomly in [
c, c
+1] is to bundle them together, as long as
c
is large enough. Still, for any
c
, the grand bundling mechanism is never optimal for large enough
n
, despite the sharp concentration of the buyer's total value for the items as
n
grows. Optimal multi-item mechanisms are rife with unintuitive properties, making multi-item generalizations of Myerson's celebrated mechanism a daunting task. We survey recent work on the structure and computational complexity of revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, providing structural as well as algorithmic generalizations of Myerson's result to multi-item settings.
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
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