Affiliation:
1. Rutgers University
2. Princeton University and Institute for Advanced Study
Abstract
A longstanding open problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to design computationally-efficient truthful mechanisms for (approximately) maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. The first such mechanism was obtained by Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira [STOC'06] who gave an
O
(log
2
m
)-approximation where
m
is the number of items. This problem has been studied extensively since, culminating in an
O
([EQUATION])-approximation mechanism by Dobzinski [STOC'16].
We present a computationally-efficient truthful mechanism with approximation ratio that improves upon the state-of-the-art by almost an exponential factor. In particular, our mechanism achieves an
O
((log log
m
)
3
)-approximation in expectation, uses only
O
(
n
) demand queries, and has universal truthfulness guarantee.
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Cited by
4 articles.
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