Affiliation:
1. Alphacore Inc, Tempe, AZ
2. Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ
Abstract
With increasing diversity of supply chains from design to delivery, there is an increasing risk that unauthorized changes can be made within an IC. One of the motivations for this type of change is to learn important information (such as encryption keys, spreading codes) from the hardware, and transmit this information to a malicious party. To evade detection, such unauthorized communication can be hidden within legitimate bursts of transmit signal. In this article, we present several signal processing techniques to detect unauthorized transmissions which can be hidden within the legitimate signal. We employ a scheme where the legitimate transmission is configured to emit a single sinusoidal waveform. We use time and spectral domain analysis techniques to explore the transmit spectrum. Since every transmission, no matter how low the signal power is, must have a spectral signature, we identify unauthorized transmission by eliminating the desired signal from the spectrum after capture. Experiment results show that when spread spectrum techniques are used, the presence of an unauthorized signal can be determined without the need for decoding the malicious signal. The proposed detection techniques need to be used as enhancements to the regular testing and verification procedures if hardware security is a concern.
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Subject
Electrical and Electronic Engineering,Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design,Computer Science Applications
Cited by
5 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Covert Communication Channels Based On Hardware Trojans: Open-Source Dataset and AI-Based Detection;2024 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST);2024-05-06
2. ICARUS: Learning on IQ and Cycle Frequencies for Detecting Anomalous RF Underlay Signals;IEEE INFOCOM 2023 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications;2023-05-17
3. Run-Time Hardware Trojan Detection in Analog and Mixed-Signal ICs;2022 IEEE 40th VLSI Test Symposium (VTS);2022-04-25
4. Digital-to-Analog Hardware Trojan Attacks;IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers;2022-02
5. Leaking Wireless ICs via Hardware Trojan-Infected Synchronization;IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing;2022