PMU-Leaker-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

PMU-Leaker

Published:2023-01-16 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the 28th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference
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Author:

Qiu Pengfei¹,Gao Qiang¹,Wang Dongsheng¹,Lyu Yongqiang¹,Wang Chunlu²,Liu Chang¹,Sun Rihui³,Qu Gang⁴

Affiliation:

1. Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

2. Ministry of Education, Beijing, China

3. Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, Heilongjiang, China

4. University of Maryland

Funder

National Natural Science Foundation of China

NSFC General Technology Fundamental Research Joint Fund

National Key Research and Development Program of China

Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3566097.3567917

Reference22 articles.

1. Port Contention for Fun and Profit

2. Template attacks on ECC implementations using performance counters in CPU

3. Who Watches the Watchmen?: Utilizing Performance Monitors for Compromising Keys of RSA on Intel Platforms

4. Ferdinand Brasser , Urs Müller , Alexandra Dmitrienko , Kari Kostiainen , Srdjan Capkun , and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi . 2017 . Software grand exposure: SGX cache attacks are practical . In USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies. USENIX Association , Vancouver, BC, 1--12. Ferdinand Brasser, Urs Müller, Alexandra Dmitrienko, Kari Kostiainen, Srdjan Capkun, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. 2017. Software grand exposure: SGX cache attacks are practical. In USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies. USENIX Association, Vancouver, BC, 1--12.

5. SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution

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1. LightFAt: Mitigating Control-Flow Explosion via Lightweight PMU-Based Control-Flow Attestation;2024 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST);2024-05-06

2. HARD-Lite: A Lightweight Hardware Anomaly Realtime Detection Framework Targeting Ransomware;IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers;2023-12

3. PMU-Spill: A New Side Channel for Transient Execution Attacks;IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers;2023-12