Computing simple mechanisms: Lift-and-round over marginal reduced forms-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Computing simple mechanisms: Lift-and-round over marginal reduced forms

Published:2022-06-09 Issue: Volume: Page:
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Container-title:Proceedings of the 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing
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Author:

Cai Yang¹,Oikonomou Argyris¹,Zhao Mingfei²

Affiliation:

1. Yale University, USA

2. Google Research, USA

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3519935.3520029

Reference35 articles.

1. Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers

2. Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction

3. Moshe Babaioff , Nicole Immorlica , Brendan Lucier , and S. Matthew Weinberg . 2014. A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer . In the 55th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS). Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and S. Matthew Weinberg. 2014. A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. In the 55th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS).

4. Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness

5. Yang Cai and Constantinos Daskalakis . 2011 . Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing. In the 52nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS). Yang Cai and Constantinos Daskalakis. 2011. Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing. In the 52nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS).

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