Affiliation:
1. Auburn University, USA
2. Virginia Tech, USA
3. Github, USA
Abstract
Context:
Kubernetes has emerged as the de-facto tool for automated container orchestration. Business and government organizations are increasingly adopting Kubernetes for automated software deployments. Kubernetes is being used to provision applications in a wide range of domains, such as time series forecasting, edge computing, and high-performance computing. Due to such a pervasive presence, Kubernetes-related security misconfigurations can cause large-scale security breaches. Thus, a systematic analysis of security misconfigurations in Kubernetes manifests, i.e., configuration files used for Kubernetes, can help practitioners secure their Kubernetes clusters.
Objective:
The goal of this paper is to help practitioners secure their Kubernetes clusters by identifying security misconfigurations that occur in Kubernetes manifests
.
Methodology:
We conduct an empirical study with 2,039 Kubernetes manifests mined from 92 open-source software repositories to systematically characterize security misconfigurations in Kubernetes manifests. We also construct a static analysis tool called Security Linter for Kubernetes Manifests (
SLI-KUBE
) to quantify the frequency of the identified security misconfigurations.
Results:
In all, we identify 11 categories of security misconfigurations, such as absent resource limit, absent
securityContext
, and activation of
hostIPC
. Specifically, we identify 1,051 security misconfigurations in 2,039 manifests. We also observe the identified security misconfigurations affect entities that perform mesh-related load balancing, as well as provision pods and stateful applications. Furthermore, practitioners agreed to fix 60% of 10 misconfigurations reported by us.
Conclusion:
Our empirical study shows Kubernetes manifests to include security misconfigurations, which necessitates security-focused code reviews and application of static analysis when Kubernetes manifests are developed.
Funder
U.S. National Science Foundation
U.S. National Security Agency
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
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