Study on Resource Optimal Allocation of Internal Threat Nuclear Security Events Based on Stackelberg Game
Author:
Affiliation:
1. Chengdu Haiguang Nuclear Power Technology Service Co.,LTD., China
2. China Nuclear Power Research and Design Institute, China
3. Hunan Key Laboratory of Nuclear Facilities Emergency Safety Technology and Equipment, China
Publisher
ACM
Link
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3677182.3677286
Reference10 articles.
1. Bunn, M. 2014. A worst practices guide to insider threats: lessons from past mistakes. J. Cambridge, Mass: American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
2. Ni S. S. & Zou S. L. & Chen J. H. 2022. Evolutionary Game Model of Internal Threats to Nuclear Security in Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plants Based on RDEU Theory. J. Sustainability.14.
3. Constrained Multi-Start Path Planning Algorithm on Large-Scale Graphs;Pu L.;J. Computer Engineering and Applications.,2023
4. Research on Insider Threat of Nuclear Security Based on Evolutionary Game;Zou S. L.;J. Journal of University of South China (Social Science Edition).,2021
5. A Meta-strategy Evolutionary Learning Algorithm for Two-person Zero-sum Game Opponent Adaptation;Zhe W.;J. Acta Automatica Sinica.,2022
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