Affiliation:
1. VMWARE Research, Herliya, Israel
2. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
3. Cornell University, NY, USA
Abstract
We do a game-theoretic analysis of leader election, under the assumption that each agent prefers to have some leader than no leader at all. We show that it is possible to obtain a
fair
Nash equilibrium, where each agent has an equal probability of being elected leader, in a completely connected network, in a bidirectional ring, and a unidirectional ring, in the synchronous setting. In the asynchronous setting, Nash equilibrium is not quite the right solution concept. Rather, we must consider
ex post
Nash equilibrium; this means that we have a Nash equilibrium no matter what a scheduling adversary does. We show that ex post Nash equilibrium is attainable in the asynchronous setting in all the networks we consider, using a protocol with bounded running time. However, in the asynchronous setting, we require that
n
> 2. We show that we can get a fair ex post
ϵ-Nash
equilibrium if
n
=2 in the asynchronous setting under some cryptographic assumptions (specifically, the existence of a one-way functions), using a
commitment protocol
. We then generalize these results to a setting where we can have deviations by a coalition of size
k
. In this case, we can get what we call a fair
k
-resilient equilibrium in a completely connected network if
n
> 2
k
; under the same cryptographic assumptions, we can a get a
k
-resilient equilibrium in a completely connected network, unidirectional ring, or bidirectional ring if
n
>
k
. Finally, we show that under minimal assumptions, not only do our protocols give a Nash equilibrium, they also give a
sequential
equilibrium, so players even play optimally off the equilibrium path.
Funder
HUJI Cyber Security Research Center
NSF
Open Philanthropy Foundation
ARO
AFOSR
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Subject
Computational Mathematics,Marketing,Economics and Econometrics,Statistics and Probability,Computer Science (miscellaneous)
Reference54 articles.
1. Distributed computing meets game theory
2. I. Abraham D. Dolev and J. Y. Halpern. 2011. On the Power of Cheap Talk. Unpublished manuscript. I. Abraham D. Dolev and J. Y. Halpern. 2011. On the Power of Cheap Talk. Unpublished manuscript.
3. Distributed Protocols for Leader Election: A Game-Theoretic Perspective
4. Distributed computing building blocks for rational agents
Cited by
12 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Rational Broadcast Protocols Against Timid Adversaries;Lecture Notes in Computer Science;2023
2. Rational Uniform Consensus with General Omission Failures;Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience;2022-08-31
3. Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Against Rational Adversaries;IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Information Theory;2022-06
4. TRAP;Proceedings of the 2022 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security;2022-05-30
5. gTour: Multiple itinerary recommendation engine for group of tourists;Expert Systems with Applications;2022-04