Auction Design for ROI-Constrained Buyers-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Auction Design for ROI-Constrained Buyers

Published:2021-04-19 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021
language:
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Author:

Golrezaei Negin¹,Lobel Ilan²,Paes Leme Renato³

Affiliation:

1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA

2. NYU, USA

3. Google, USA

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3442381.3449841

Reference22 articles.

1. AdRoll. 2015. State of the Industry: A close look at retargeting and the programmatic marketer Survey responses from 1 000 marketers. https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/US_AdRoll_State_of_the_Industry.pdf(2015). AdRoll. 2015. State of the Industry: A close look at retargeting and the programmatic marketer Survey responses from 1 000 marketers. https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/US_AdRoll_State_of_the_Industry.pdf(2015).

2. An empirical analysis of return on investment maximization in sponsored search auctions

3. Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design

4. Santiago Balseiro and Yonatan Gur. 2017. Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium. (2017). Santiago Balseiro and Yonatan Gur. 2017. Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium. (2017).

5. Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions

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