Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?

Published:2022-07-12 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
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Author:

Bergemann Dirk¹,Cai Yang¹,Velegkas Grigoris¹,Zhao Mingfei²

Affiliation:

1. Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

2. Google Research, Mountain View, CA, USA

Funder

NSF (National Science Foundation)

Onassis Foundation Scholarship

Bodossaki Foundation Scholarship

Sloan Foundation Research Fellowship

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3490486.3538304

Reference41 articles.

1. AE Ades , G Lu , and K Claxton . 2004. Expected value of sample information calculations in medical decision modeling. Medical decision making , Vol. 24 , 2 ( 2004 ), 207--227. AE Ades, G Lu, and K Claxton. 2004. Expected value of sample information calculations in medical decision modeling. Medical decision making, Vol. 24, 2 (2004), 207--227.

2. Luigi Ambrosio , Nicola Fusco , and Diego Pallara . 2000. Functions of bounded variation and free discontinuity problems . Courier Corporation . Luigi Ambrosio, Nicola Fusco, and Diego Pallara. 2000. Functions of bounded variation and free discontinuity problems. Courier Corporation.

3. A/B Testing with Fat Tails

4. Moshe Babaioff , Nicole Immorlica , Brendan Lucier , and S. Matthew Weinberg . 2014. A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer . In the 55th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS). Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and S. Matthew Weinberg. 2014. A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. In the 55th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS).

5. Optimal mechanisms for selling information