Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location

Published:2022-07-12 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
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Author:

Agrawal Priyank¹,Balkanski Eric²,Gkatzelis Vasilis³,Ou Tingting¹,Tan Xizhi³

Affiliation:

1. Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

2. Columbia University, New Tork, NY, USA

3. Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA, USA

Funder

National Science Foundation

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3490486.3538306

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3. Online Graph Algorithms with Predictions

4. Etienne Bamas , Andreas Maggiori , and Ola Svensson . 2020. The Primal-Dual method for Learning Augmented Algorithms . In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems , H. Larochelle, M. Ranzato, R. Hadsell, M. F. Balcan, and H. Lin (Eds.). 2008 3--20094. Etienne Bamas, Andreas Maggiori, and Ola Svensson. 2020. The Primal-Dual method for Learning Augmented Algorithms. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, H. Larochelle, M. Ranzato, R. Hadsell, M. F. Balcan, and H. Lin (Eds.). 20083--20094.

5. Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions

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