Affiliation:
1. University of Athens
2. University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals; in this sense, our model lies at the intersection of prior-free mechanism design and secretary problems. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competitive with
F
(2)
. We give a generic reduction that transforms any offline auction to an online one with only a loss of a factor of 2 in the competitive ratio. We also present some natural auctions, both randomized and deterministic, and study their competitive ratio. Our analysis reveals some interesting connections of one of these auctions with RSOP.
Funder
Seventh Framework Programme
Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
ESF-NSRF research program Thales
Google
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Subject
Computational Mathematics,Marketing,Economics and Econometrics,Statistics and Probability,Computer Science (miscellaneous)
Cited by
3 articles.
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