Eliciting Expertise without Verification-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Eliciting Expertise without Verification

Published:2018-06-11 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
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Author:

Kong Yuqing¹,Schoenebeck Grant¹

Affiliation:

1. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

Funder

National Science Foundation

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3219166.3219172

Reference37 articles.

1. Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users

2. Syed Mumtaz Ali and Samuel D Silvey. 1966. A general class of coefficients of divergence of one distribution from another. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) (1966) 131--142. Syed Mumtaz Ali and Samuel D Silvey. 1966. A general class of coefficients of divergence of one distribution from another. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) (1966) 131--142.

3. Thomas M Cover and Joy A Thomas. 2006. Elements of information theory 2nd edition. (2006). Thomas M Cover and Joy A Thomas. 2006. Elements of information theory 2nd edition. (2006).

4. Imre Csiszár Paul C Shields etal 2004. Information theory and statistics: A tutorial. Foundations and Trends® in Communications and Information Theory Vol. 1 4 (2004) 417--528. 10.1561/0100000004 Imre Csiszár Paul C Shields et al. 2004. Information theory and statistics: A tutorial. Foundations and Trends® in Communications and Information Theory Vol. 1 4 (2004) 417--528. 10.1561/0100000004

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