Ad Auction Design with Coupon-Dependent Conversion Rate in the Auto-bidding World-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Ad Auction Design with Coupon-Dependent Conversion Rate in the Auto-bidding World

Published:2023-04-30 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:
Container-title:Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2023
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Ni Bonan¹^ORCID,Wang Xun²^ORCID,Zhang Qi³^ORCID,Tang Pingzhong⁴^ORCID,Chen Zhourong³^ORCID,Yin Tianjiu³^ORCID,Lu Liangni³^ORCID,Liu Xiaobing³^ORCID,Sun Kewu²^ORCID,Ma Zhe²^ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University, China

2. Intelligent Science & Technology Academy of CASIC, China and Scientific Research Key Laboratory of Aerospace Defence Intelligent Systems and Technology, China

3. ByteDance, China

4. TuringSense, China and Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University, China

Funder

National Key Research and Development Program of China

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Publisher

ACM

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3543507.3583230

Reference35 articles.

1. Autobidding with Constraints

2. Moshe Babaioff , Richard Cole , Jason Hartline , Nicole Immorlica , and Brendan Lucier . 2021 . Non-Quasi-Linear Agents in Quasi-Linear Mechanisms. In 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021). Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. Moshe Babaioff, Richard Cole, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, and Brendan Lucier. 2021. Non-Quasi-Linear Agents in Quasi-Linear Mechanisms. In 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021). Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik.

3. Santiago Balseiro , Yuan Deng , Jieming Mao , Vahab Mirrokni , and Song Zuo . 2021. Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34 ( 2021 ). Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo. 2021. Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34 (2021).

4. The Landscape of Auto-bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization

5. Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium

Cited by 1 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints;Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024;2024-05-13