Timing Side-Channel Mitigation via Automated Program Repair

Author:

Ruan Haifeng1ORCID,Noller Yannic2ORCID,Tizpaz-Niari Saeid3ORCID,Chattopadhyay Sudipta4ORCID,Roychoudhury Abhik1ORCID

Affiliation:

1. National University of Singapore, Singapore

2. Ruhr University Bochum, Germany

3. University of Texas at El Paso, USA

4. Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore

Abstract

Side-channel vulnerability detection has gained prominence recently due to Spectre and Meltdown attacks. Techniques for side-channel detection range from fuzz testing to program analysis and program composition. Existing side-channel mitigation techniques repair the vulnerability at the IR/binary level or use runtime monitoring solutions. In both cases, the source code itself is not modified, can evolve while keeping the vulnerability, and the developer would get no feedback on how to develop secure applications in the first place. Thus, these solutions do not help the developer understand the side-channel risks in her code and do not provide guidance to avoid code patterns with side-channel risks. In this paper, we present Pendulum , the first approach for automatically locating and repairing side-channel vulnerabilities in the source code, specifically for timing side channels. Our approach uses a quantitative estimation of found vulnerabilities to guide the fix localization, which goes hand-in-hand with a pattern-guided repair. Our evaluation shows that Pendulum can repair a large number of side-channel vulnerabilities in real-world applications. Overall, our approach integrates vulnerability detection, quantization, localization, and repair into one unified process. This also enhances the possibility of our side-channel mitigation approach being adopted into programming environments.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)

Reference63 articles.

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