The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

Published:2023-03-31 Issue:1-2 Volume:11 Page:1-26
ISSN:2167-8375
Container-title:ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
language:en
Short-container-title:ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.

Author:

Ahunbay Mete Şeref¹^ORCID,Vetta Adrian²^ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Technical University of Munich, School of Computation, Information and Technology, Germany

2. McGill University, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Canada

Abstract

We study the efficiency of first-/second-price sequential multiunit auctions with two buyers and complete information. Extending the primal-dual framework for obtaining efficiency bounds to this sequential setting, we obtain tight price of anarchy bounds. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 1/T for auctions with T items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by 1-1/e≃ 0.632 . This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)

Subject

Computational Mathematics,Marketing,Economics and Econometrics,Statistics and Probability,Computer Science (miscellaneous)

Link

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3584864

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