A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
Author:
Affiliation:
1. McGill University, Canada
2. Microsoft Research, USA
3. Princeton University, USA
Funder
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
Publisher
ACM
Link
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2897518.2897645
Reference38 articles.
1. A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
2. Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method
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